With Whom to Dance? Partnering Strategy in Governmental Venture Capital Syndication and New Venture Growth
Guo Zhuopin1, Zhang Shiyun2
1. School of Business, East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai 201620, China; 2. School of Intelligent Finance and Business, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Suzhou 215412, China
Abstract：GVC can leverage financial resources and promote technological innovation by syndicating with other venture capitalists.Because different investors follow distinct logics,GVC's syndication partners may lead to varying investment outcomes.Using GVC syndication data,this study examines how GVC's syndication strategies influence the innovation and IPO performance of new ventures.The results show that GVC syndication generally enhances firms' innovation and entrepreneurial outcomes.However,compared with GVC-PVC syndications,GVC-GVC syndications significantly reduce IPO performance while increasing innovation.These findings highlight how different partners shape venture development and offer insights for policymakers seeking to strengthen GVC effectiveness.
郭卓玭, 张诗韵. 与谁共舞？政府风险投资联合投资伙伴策略与新创企业成长[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2026(1): 81-88.
Guo Zhuopin, Zhang Shiyun. With Whom to Dance? Partnering Strategy in Governmental Venture Capital Syndication and New Venture Growth. , 2026(1): 81-88.
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