Structural Contradictions in Compensation and Performance Guarantee for Researchers under National Mission Orientation ——An Organizational Mechanism Analysis Based on Frontline Research at National Research Institutions
Yao Chang1,2,3, He Limin4, Xiao Bing2
1. Technical Institute of Physics and Chemistry,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100089,China; 2. Institutes of Science and Development,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China; 3. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100049,China; 4. National Defense Innovation Institute,Academy of Military Sciences,Beijing 100072,China
Abstract：Ensuring that researchers can focus on their core responsibilities has become an important governance issue for national research institutions.Based on survey and interview evidence,this study adopts the perspective of internal governance within the smallest research organizational unit and constructs a three-party game-theoretic framework involving government research sponsors,research institutes,and research teams.The findings show that inadequate personnel-cost coverage by government-funded projects,limited capacity of research institutes to provide stable support,and team expansion under decentralized organization interact to make research teams dependent on industry-sponsored projects to fill gaps in salaries,performance-based pay,and operating expenses,resulting in a stable equilibrium characterized by“low coverage-downward pressure transmission-simultaneous engagement in government-funded and industry-sponsored projects.”Internal coordination within research teams should be distinguished between survival-oriented coordination and strategic coordination:the former is driven by gaps in basic support and tends to weaken targeted incentives,whereas the latter centers on task allocation,complementary capabilities,and long-term capacity building.Higher-level coordination of personnel,tasks,and shared resources can reduce dependence on industry-sponsored projects,but excessive reliance on particular scientific leaders creates structural fragility.Reform should increase the reasonable coverage of personnel costs,strengthen stable buffering capacity at the institute level,tighten constraints on team size,and regulate internal redistribution within research teams.
姚畅, 何丽敏, 肖冰. 国家任务导向下科研人员薪酬绩效保障的结构性矛盾——基于国家科研机构一线调研的组织机制分析[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2026(9): 21-33.
Yao Chang, He Limin, Xiao Bing. Structural Contradictions in Compensation and Performance Guarantee for Researchers under National Mission Orientation ——An Organizational Mechanism Analysis Based on Frontline Research at National Research Institutions. , 2026(9): 21-33.
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