Abstract：During the Trump 2.0 era,the United States has continuously escalated its semiconductor export controls against China,aiming to curb China's advanced technology development,build an exclusive innovation ecosystem,and isolate China from global innovation networks.Drawing on national innovation system and policy coordination theories,this paper constructs an efficacy evaluation framework for the U.S.export controls coordination mechanism.The findings show that U.S.controls on China have formed a systemic coordination mechanism that evolved from discrete embargoes into the horizontal integration of cross-sectoral instruments and vertically reliance on“whole-of-government”synergy and“mini-multi-lateral alliances”.Future controls will move toward legislative intensification,capitalization,and layered alliances,forming a more penetrative regulatory system.The mechanism achieves short-term deterrence and isolation,but its internal contradictions,high coordination costs,and negative spillovers undermine the sustainability of its effectiveness,which paradoxically drive adaptive transformation in China's innovation system.In response,China should balance development and security,build an open innovation ecosystem,reinforce internal supply via a new system for mobilizing resources nationwide to counter external controls,raise U.S.coordination costs through targeted countermeasures and an optimized institution,and reshape external linkages through diversified cooperation to differentiate alliance encirclement,thereby gaining strategic initiative and becoming a key hub in the restructuring of global innovation networks.
郭畅. 特朗普2.0时期美国对华半导体出口管制协同机制及中国因应策略[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2026(8): 177-188.
Guo Chang. The U.S.Semiconductor Export Control Coordination Mechanism Against China in the Trump 2.0 Era and China's Response Strategies. , 2026(8): 177-188.
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