Abstract：Against the backdrop of the state's clear positioning of data as a key factor of production and the vigorous promotion of its market-based allocation,the debate over the optimal regulatory path in the field of data governance has intensified.This debate centers on the relative merits of a propertization model,which focuses on the demarcation of property rights,versus an“enabling”model,which prioritizes the regulation of conduct.This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the challenges confronting the traditional propertization approach in data governance,including market failure,high transaction costs,and the risk of the“tragedy of the anticommons.”It argues that this approach is ill-suited to the non-rivalrous nature and dynamically appreciating value of data.By examining the judicial application of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law in China and its underlying Law and Economics principles, this paper argues for this law's comparative advantage as an“enabling”path for data protection.Its advantage lies in providing remedial incentives,rather than creation-based incentives.In situations where the ex ante cost of defining data rights is high while the ex post cost of assessing damages is relatively low,this remedial path,oriented around a liability rule,effectively reduces the costs of rights demarcation and valuation.At the same time,it avoids the problems of data monopoly,abuse of rights, and widespread infringement that creation-based incentives can induce,making it more aligned with the needs of data protection.Consequently,this paper proposes that the regulatory practice for the market-based allocation of data elements must move beyond the“propertization dilemma”and pivot towards a new“enabling”paradigm,exemplified by the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.
余蔚琳. 数据要素的规制路径:从“赋权困境”到“反法赋能”[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2025(10): 152-159.
Yu Weilin. The Regulatory Path for Data Elements:From the Propertization Dilemma to an Enabling Paradigm via the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. , 2025(10): 152-159.
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