Innovation Strategy Choices of Domestic Semiconductor Enterprises under Chokepoint Constraints:An Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Collaborative R&D and Free-Riding Behavior
Han Jun
High-Quality Development Evaluation Institute,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210003,China
Abstract：Against the backdrop of the restructuring of the global semiconductor industrial chain and the intensification of technology blockades,domestic semiconductor enterprises face constraints characterized by high investment,high risk,and strong externalities.Drawing on theories of collaborative innovation,opportunism,and evolutionary games,this study constructs both a bilateral evolutionary game model between enterprises and a tripartite evolutionary game model involving enterprises and the government.It incorporates factors such as the intensity of technology blockades,knowledge spillovers,and government incentives,and uses numerical simulations to analyze strategic evolutionary paths and stability conditions.The findings reveal that collaborative R&D can become a stable strategy only when it simultaneously satisfies the conditions of sustainability and diffusion.Free-riding behavior stems from the quasi-public-good attributes of R&D outcomes,information asymmetry,and insufficient punishment mechanisms.Technology blockades not only increase R&D costs and reduce the probability of successful technological breakthroughs but also strengthen the demand for joint efforts to tackle key technologies.Government subsidies,punishment mechanisms,and cross-actor coordination can reshape the stability domain of the system and alter the threshold for cooperation.The simulation results indicate that increasing subsidy intensity helps lower the threshold for the diffusion of cooperation,while enhancing punishment severity and detection probability helps suppress free-riding behavior.Based on the above conclusions,some suggestions are put forward,such as optimizing the subsidy structure,improving the intellectual property rights and credit punishment mechanism,and promoting the professional cooperation of the industrial chain.
韩军. “卡脖子”困境下国产半导体企业的创新策略选择:基于协同研发与搭便车行为的演化博弈[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2026(8): 116-125.
Han Jun. Innovation Strategy Choices of Domestic Semiconductor Enterprises under Chokepoint Constraints:An Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Collaborative R&D and Free-Riding Behavior. , 2026(8): 116-125.
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