Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Study of Low-Carbon Environmentally-Sound Technology Innovation Diffusion
Xiao Hanjie1,2,Wang Hua1
1.State Key Laboratory of Complex Nonferrous Metal Resources Clean Utilization,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093,China; 2.Quality Development Institute,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093,China
Abstract：Firstly it built a payoff matrix based on parameters affecting the decision making of enterprises like technological complementary proportion,government incentives and penalty loss and gain in the industry.Then,it made a numerical simulation analysis by means of matlab.Simulation outcomes show that,technological innovation diffusion demands an optimization of environment control system by the government,and a cleaner internal environment of the industry.When there is a stronger technological complementation,both game players will be more inclined to make decision of diffusion,Which means there is a larger probability of technological innovation diffusion among enterprises.Government incentives is conducive to the diffusion decision among enterprises
[1]刘芬,赵鲁涛,程蕾,等.低碳环境友好技术转移研究综述[J].中国能源,2013,35(12):38-41,43. [2]OCKWELL D G,WATSON J,MACKERRON G,et al.Key policy considerations for facilitating low carbon technology transfer to developing countries[J].Energy policy,2008,36(11):4104-4115. [3]刘贞,蒲刚清,施於人,等.钢铁行业碳减排情景仿真分析及评价研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012,22(3):77-81. [4]DIJK M,KEMP R,VALKERING P.Incorporating social context and co-evolution in an innovation diffusion model—with an application to cleaner vehicles[J].Journal of evolutionary economics,2013,23(2):295-329. [5]HOEN K M R,TAN T,FRANSOO J C,et al.Effect of carbon emission regulations on transport mode selection under stochastic demand[J].Flexible services and manufacturing journal,2014,26(1-2):170-195. [6]张发树,何建坤,刘滨,等.低碳技术国际转移的双重博弈研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2010,20(4):12-16. [7]STUMMER C,KIESLING E,GNTHER M,et al.Innovation diffusion of repeat purchase products in a competitive market:an agent-based simulation approach[J].European journal of operational research,2015,245(1):157-167. [8]曹霞,张路蓬.企业绿色技术创新扩散的演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(7):68-76. [9]王靖宇,史安娜.低碳技术扩散中地方政府与中央政府行为的博弈分析[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(12):12-15. [10]欧训民,张希良,王若水.低碳技术国际转移双层多主体博弈模型[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2012(02):234-237,242. [11]张华,魏晓平.绿色悖论抑或倒逼减排——环境规制对碳排放影响的双重效应[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(9):21-29. [12]曹柬,吴晓波,周根贵,等.制造企业绿色产品创新与扩散过程中的博弈分析[J].系统工程学报,2012,27(5):617-625. [13]蒋佳妮,王灿.气候有益技术Know-how转让之知识产权立法障碍及应对[J].兰州大学学报(社会科学版),2015,43(1):147-156. [14]马丁,陈文颖.中国钢铁行业技术减排的协同效益分析[J].中国环境科学,2015,35(1):298-303. [15]张倩,曲世友.环境规制对企业绿色技术创新的影响研究及政策启示[J].中国科技论坛,2013(7):11-17.
2017, 
