Abstract：By matching the word frequency related to innovation in the government work reports of provincial and prefecture-level cities with the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed enterprises from 2007 to 2018, the fixed effect regression model is employed to explore the relationship between government policy bias, hierarchy conflict and enterprise innovation investment.The results show that government policy bias is conducive to increasing enterprise innovation investment, and government hierarchy conflict weakens the positive impact of government policy bias on enterprise innovation investment.The results are still valid after considering endogeneity and robustness tests.Through mechanism verification it is found that government policy bias to increase enterprise innovation investment by increasing financial subsidies and tax incentives.Further analysis shows that local government debt weakens the positive effect of government policy bias on enterprise innovation investment, and managements risk preference reinforces the positive effect of government policy bias on enterprise innovation investment.This paper has a certain reference significance for the government and micro enterprises to formulate innovation-driven development strategy.
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