Abstract：Japan's science and technology talent policies have exhibited phased characteristics with the changes of the times.Following the Meiji Restoration and the post-World War II period,Japan implemented a series of supportive policies for science and technology talents,transforming itself from a technology-catching-up country to a technology-leading one.By the early 21st century,it witnessed a boom in Nobel Prize wins.This became a benchmark in global scientific and technological competition.However,in recent years,the growth rate of Japan's Nobel Prizes has slowed down,exposing the profound alienation of its talent policies from“incentivizing innovation”to“pursuing metrics”.The risk transmission mechanism manifests in three aspects:the design of policy objectives has shifted from pursuing innovation to short-term utilitarianism;the implementation of resource allocation has drifted from efficient adaptation to parochial drawbacks;and the innovative talent ecosystem has changed from a gathering of elites to a state of generational gap.The institutional roots of this policy alienation lie in three key factors:bureaucratic performance evaluation systems that bind both the government and research entities to metrics;the distribution of competitive funds that exacerbates the Matthew Effect in scientific research resources;and traditional personnel systems that hinder the promotion of innovative talents.China must draw lessons from this,mind issues such as the“Nobel Prize metric trap”,“resource siphoning”,and“seniority barriers”,and rely on institutional resilience to meet the challenges in global scientific and technological competition.
戴淑琳. 从诺奖“井喷”到增长乏力:日本科技人才政策的异化及其制度根源[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2026(4): 10-19.
Dai Shulin. From the Nobel Prize Boom to Stagnating Growth: The Alienation of Japan's Science and Technology Talent Policies and Its Institutional Roots. , 2026(4): 10-19.
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