Executive Compensation Incentives, Industrial Subsidy Policy and Disruptive Technological Innovation
Wang Wenna1, Liu Jiejiao2
1. University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Graduate School), Beijing 102488, China; 2. Institute of Industrial Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100044, China
Abstract：Based on the Bertrand price competition model, the article aims to analyze how the internal and external incentives mechanism of the enterprises can influence the decision-making on disruptive technological innovation through the R&D expected profit function.Several results stand out.From the perspective of internal incentive mechanism, the enterprise executives tend to engage in technological innovation in the short term and the motivation for disruptive technological innovation is not strong.From the perspective of external incentive mechanism, the probability of collusion is negatively correlated with the probability of disruptive technological innovation.Instead, competitively compatible subsidy policies have a positive effect on disruptive technological innovation;The knowledge spillover effect will change the marginal cost of fringe firms within the industry, which implies the policies to promote the knowledge spillover and positively enhance the probability of disruptive technological.This paper proposes that the enterprises should develop internal and external interactive innovation communities based on the block-chain technology, while the government should implement competition-friendly subsidy policy and focus on creating a good atmosphere for discruptive technological innovation
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