如何最大化释放新型研发机构的要素潜在贡献率——基于股权-控制权优化配置视角

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Abstract The dynamic and optimal allocation of equity-control rights in new R&D institutions is the key to stimulate the synergistic interaction among the government,research teams and commercialization entities and release the deep innovation potential(as factor potential contribution rates)of financial funds,talented personnel and technology and social capital,so as to crack the dilemma of R&D achievements transformation.To enhance factor potential contribution rates of all subjects,we utilize the cooperative game modelling and numerical simulation,and select equity-control rights as the incentive tool to analyze its effect on factor potential contribution rates,as well as characteristics of dynamic allocation structure of equity-control rights.It can be found that the optimal equity-control rights allocation structure in new R&D institutions is in which the research teams hold large equity rights and commercialization entities hold multiple control rights.The reverse adjustment of equity and control rights between research teams and commercialization entities can promote a positive coupling effect;a single adjustment of control rights is likely to produce a crowding-out effect of resources and value,while the disparate equity rights structure can amplify the positive effect of control rights adjustment on factor potential contribution rates.Furthermore,the equity rights transfer and orderly exit of the government can increase incentive ranges for research teams and commercialization entities.

Key words： The new R&D institution Factor potential contribution rate Equity-control right Asymmetric allocation structure

Received: 20 September 2024

PACS:	F224
	C93

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	Zhao Yingmei
	Wang Wenping

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Zhao Yingmei,Wang Wenping. How to Maximize the Factor Potential Contribution Rates in New R&D Institutions: From an Optimal Equity-Control Rights Allocation Perspective[J]. , 2025, 6(7): 45-56.

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http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2025/V6/I7/45

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