Influence of Government Subsidies on the Performance of Rare Earth Enterprises in China
Zheng Minggui1, 2, Dong Juan1, Zhong Changbiao3
1. School of Economics and Management, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Ganzhou 341000, China; 2. School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; 3. School of Business, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China
Abstract：Rare earth is a key strategic mineral resource.In order to alleviate the market failure of rare earth industry, the Chinese government has been carrying out macro-control by means of financial subsidies.On the basis of constructing the theoretical analysis framework between government subsidy, production factor, enterprise performance and organizational capital, the paper takes Chinese rare earth listed companies as samples, divides the front and back end of the industrial chain, and uses the method of combining empirical research and case analysis to explore the influence mechanism of government subsidies on the performance of rare earth enterprises in China.The results show that:①Government subsidies significantly promote the performance of the back-end enterprises in rare earth industry chain through the full mediating role of technology R&D investment, and organizational capital has a positive moderating role on the latter half path of the mediating role.②Government subsidies have no significant effect on the performance of the front-end enterprises in rare earth industry chain, because government subsidies fail to motivate the front-end enterprises to increase technology R&D investment, and only have a significant positive effect on fixed assets investment.Organizational capital has a negative moderating role in the relationship between government subsidies and fixed assets investment.According to the empirical results, policy suggestions are put forward from two aspects:optimizing the guidance of government subsidies and strengthening the construction of enterprise organizational capital.
郑明贵, 董娟, 钟昌标. 政府补助对中国稀土企业绩效的影响[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2020(10): 93-103.
Zheng Minggui, Dong Juan, Zhong Changbiao. Influence of Government Subsidies on the Performance of Rare Earth Enterprises in China. , 2020(10): 93-103.
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