对华科技脱钩政策下的美国数字公司:压力与行动

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Abstract U.S.science and technology decoupling policy towards China,aiming at industry localization and “de-Sinicization”,has imposed top-bottom pressures upon U.S.digital firms,such as export loss,industrial transfer burden,cooperative chain break,brain drain,and deprivation of recombination profit channels,etc.They respond to the science and technology decoupling policy through adjusting export direction,localization and differentiation tactics,and digital multi-facet development.The connection between U.S.digital firms and the Chinese market cannot be cut off by the decoupling policy in the short term.U.S.digital firms treat the Chinese market with five types of stances-stimulating opposition,complete obedience,rational cooperation,compromise mediation and bilateral comfort.Against the background of the fluctuation of the decoupling policy,they have been seeking to export digital technology products with low security sensitivity,exploring cooperation arenas beyond regulation policy,and catering to the alliance strategy of the U.S.government.As U.S.gradually takes science and technology issues with over-securitization manner,U.S.digital firms are involved in the politicization tide,intervene in elections to affect the direction of science and technology decoupling,press the U.S.government to relax its science and technology decoupling policy towards China,and demand subsidies and financial support from the U.S.government to make up for the loss caused by decoupling,thus generating reversal pressures upon the U.S.government.

Key words： Science and technology decoupling Digital firm U.S. China Politicization

Received: 22 September 2022

PACS:

D815.5

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	Liu Xinghua
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Cite this article:

Liu Xinghua,Wu Yu. U.S.Digital Firms Under the Science and Technology Decoupling Policy Towards China:Pressures and Actions[J]. , 2023, 4(8): 180-188.

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http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2023/V4/I8/180

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