地方政府创新偏好的区域差异及其影响因素研究——来自295个城市的经验证据

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Abstract Exploring local government innovation preferences(GIPs)is of great significance for improving the overall effectiveness of NIS construction.This paper uses panel data from 295 cities in China in 2011—2020 to analyze the regional differences of local GIPs and its influencing factors.The research finds that the regions with strong GIPs are concentrated in the economically developed Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta,as well as the high administrative level cities.Higher administrative level cities have stronger GIPs than ordinary prefecture level cities.The regression analysis shows that fiscal capacity,innovation potential and government competition are the key factors explaining the regional differences of local GIPs.Local governments of cities with stronger fiscal capacity and greater innovation potential are more inclined to increase fiscal expenditure on science and technology(FEST).Government competition will further promote local governments to increase FEST,which will enhance the GIPs.This study provide enlightenment for regulating local FEST and guiding local governments to transform the idea of development from“competition for innovation”to“coopetition for innovation”.

Key words： Local government Innovation preference Fiscal expenditure on scientific and technological Regional difference

Received: 02 September 2022

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K901

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	Articles by authors
	Cai Yonglong
	Li Wenhui
	Chen Qi
	Chen Zhongnuan

Cite this article:

Cai Yonglong,Li Wenhui,Chen Qi, et al. A Study on the Regional Differences of Local Government Innovation Preferences and its Influencing Factors——Empirical Evidence from295 Cities in China[J]. , 2023, 4(7): 33-41.

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http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2023/V4/I7/33

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