财政分权、地方政府竞争与技术创新——基于277个地级市的空间计量分析

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Abstract Based on the innovation-driven development strategy and the new political achievement view,this paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization,local government competition and technological innovation,and analyzes the behavior choices made by local governments in the face of technological innovation from the perspective of official incentives.According to the panel data of 277 cities from 2008 to 2017,the SDM show that fiscal decentralization is conducive to promoting local technological innovation,but economic competition will significantly inhibit fiscal decentralization on local technological innovation.The spatial effect found that economic competition has a certain promotion effect on technological innovation in areas with similar development levels,indicating that with the promotion of innovation-driven development strategies and the new achievement view,the adverse effects of local government competition on technological innovation have been corrected to a certain extent.

Key words： Fiscal decentralization Technological innovation Government competition SDM

Received: 01 June 2020

PACS:

F812.2

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	Chen Kai
	Xiao Peng

Cite this article:

Chen Kai,Xiao Peng. Fiscal Decentralization,Government Competition and Technological Innovation——Spatial Econometric Analysis Based on 277 Cities[J]. , 2021, 2(2): 69-79.

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http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2021/V2/I2/69

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