新型研发组织运行治理的多层次利益分配与激励机制——以江苏省产业技术研究院及其40家专业研究所为例

Abstract
Figure/Table
References
Related Citation (3)

Download: PDF (9146 KB) HTML (1 KB)
Export: BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)

Abstract A large number of studies have shown that New R&D Organization have important functions and meanings to break through the “high walls of the system” and cross the “Valley of Death”.However,there are few literatures on the internal dynamics of sustainable operation of New R&D Organization.Based on the analysis of the operation logic of Jiangsu Industrial Technology Research Institute (JITRI)and its 40 professional institutes,this paper attempts to propose a multilevel nested framework for the operation governance of New R&D Organization.Based on this,the paper designs the profit distribution function of participation of all parties involved,builds a multilevel incentive coordination game model for New R&D Organization,and infers from the cooperative and non-cooperative stages.The results indicate that the degree of R&D effort coordination is related to the contribution coefficient,not to the cost coefficient for New R&D Organization.The benefit distribution coefficient of all parties affects the overall benefit,and its size depends on the work efficiency cost coefficient.Inside professional institute,the best efforts of the researcher and the marketer are related to a variety of factors,including the revenue distribution coefficient,contribution coefficient and cost coefficient of both parties.It is worth noting that when the researcher and the marketer expand benefit distribution coefficient of itself,they should also attention the coordination with each other to improve the overall performance of the industry-university-research cooperation.Finally,corresponding suggestions for multilevel interests distribution and incentive coordination are proposed.This paper has certain reference and inspiration for deepening the theoretical research of sustainable development of New R&D Organization and practical development.

Key words： New R&D Organization Operational governance Interests distribution function Incentive mechanism

Received: 04 December 2019

PACS:

G322.2

	Service

	E-mail this article
	Add to my bookshelf
	Add to citation manager
	E-mail Alert
	RSS
	Articles by authors
	Jiang Chun
	Ding Ziyi

Cite this article:

Jiang Chun,Ding Ziyi. Mechanism of Multilevel Interests Distribution and Incentive Coordination in the Operational Governance of New Research and Development Organization ——An Empirical Study in JITRI and Its 40 Professional Institutes[J]. , 2020, 1(7): 60-72.

URL:

http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2020/V1/I7/60

[1]叶祥松,刘敬.异质性研发、政府支持与中国科技创新困境[J].经济研究,2018,53 (9):116-132.
[2]陈红喜,姜春,罗利华,等.改革开放40年产业科技创新动态演进的 “深圳模式”[J].科技进步与对策,2018,35 (24):46-55.
[3]PAUL L.Can marketplace science be trusted?[J].Nature,2019,574 (24):481-485.
[4]刘则渊,陈悦.新巴斯德象限:高科技政策的新范式[J].管理学报,2007 (3):346-353.
[5]CHESBROUGH H,BOGERS M.Explicating open innovation:clarifying an emerging paradigm for understanding innovation[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2014.
[6]ETZKOWITZ H,LEYDESDORFF L.The dynamics of innovation:from national systems and “Mode 2” to a triple helix of university-industry-government relations[J].Research policy,2000,29 (2):109-123.
[7]VILLANI E,RASMUSSEN E,GRIMALDI R.How intermediary organizations facilitate university-industry technology transfer:a proximity approach[J].Technological forecasting & social change,2017,114 (1):86-102.
[8]LIU Y Promoting cross-border knowledge transfer for new product development in MNCs:a process view[J].The journal of technology transfer,2019,44 (3):802-821.
[9]陈红喜,姜春,袁瑜,等.基于新巴斯德象限的新型研发机构科技成果转移转化模式研究——以江苏省产业技术研究院为例[J].科技进步与对策,2018,35 (11):36-45.
[10]陈劲,张学文.中国创新驱动发展与科技体制改革 (2012—2017)[J].科学学研究,2018,36 (12):2116-2121.
[11]魏江,应瑛,刘洋.研发网络分散化,组织学习顺序与创新绩效:比较案例研究[J].管理世界,2014 (2):137-151+188.
[12]吴建南,李怀祖.构建技术服务市场,实施动态技术转移——基本技术基础设施若干问题的探讨[J].科学学研究,1999 (1):88-92.
[13]姚永玲.从创新效率与经济增长关系看科技政策[J].管理世界,2009 (12):170-171.
[14]李光龙,范贤贤.财政支出、科技创新与经济高质量发展——基于长江经济带108个城市的实证检验[J].上海经济研究,2019 (10):46-60.
[15]ROMER P M.Endogenous technological change[J].Journal of political economy,1990,98 (5):S71-S102.
[16]COE D T,HELPMAN E.International R&D spillovers[J].European economic review,1995,39 (5):859-887.
[17]张义芳,翟立新.创新型国家目标下政府科技研发组织体系的变革与发展[J].中国软科学,2011 (4):118-124.
[18]陈劲,张学文.中国创新驱动发展与科技体制改革 (2012—2017)[J].科学学研究,2018,36 (12):2116-2121.
[19]HENRY W C.Open innovation:the new imperative for creating and profiting from technology[M].Brighton:Harvard Business School Press,2003.
[20]王勇,王蒲生.新型科研机构模型兼与巴斯德象限比较[J].科学管理研究,2014,32 (6):29-32.
[21]吴卫,银路.巴斯德象限取向模型与新型研发机构功能定位[J].技术经济,2016,35 (8):38-44.
[22]谭小琴.跨越 “死亡谷”:新型研发机构的三维创新[J].自然辩证法研究,2019,35 (1):39-43.
[23]朱建军,蔡静雯,刘思峰,等.江苏新型研发机构运行机制及建设策略研究[J].科技进步与对策,2013,30 (14):36-39.
[24]丁红燕,李冰玉,宋姣.新型研发机构创新发展机制研究[J].山东社会科学,2019 (3):125-130.
[25]陈宝明,刘光武,丁明磊.我国新型研发组织发展现状与政策建议[J].中国科技论坛,2013 (3):27-31.
[26]陈少毅,吴红斌.创新驱动战略下新型研发机构发展的问题及对策[J].宏观经济管理,2018 (6):43-49.
[27]何帅,陈良华.新型科研机构创新绩效的影响机理研究[J].科学学研究,2019,37 (7):1306-1315.
[28]周恩德,刘国新.我国新型研发机构创新绩效影响因素实证研究——以广东省为例[J].科技进步与对策,2018,35 (9):42-47.
[29]任志宽.新型研发机构产学研合作模式及机制研究[J].中国科技论坛,2019 (10):16-23.
[30]夏太寿,张玉赋,高冉晖,等.我国新型研发机构协同创新模式与机制研究——以苏粤陕6家新型研发机构为例[J].科技进步与对策,2014,31 (14):13-18.
[31]郑春.新型科研活动模式及组织机制研究[J].科学管理研究,2012,30 (5):34-37.
[32]原长弘,王钰莹,刘朝.政府—发起单位双元构建模式研究——基于重庆四家新型研发机构的多案例研究[J].中国科技论坛,2019 (2):22-28.
[33]赵吟佳.科研活动执行主体转变后新型科研体系的构建[J].科学学研究,2003 (3):259-262.
[34]罗嘉文,米银俊,赵天阳.依托新型研发机构建设的工科大学生创新创业能力培养路径研究[J].高教探索,2019 (7):117-122.
[35]陈红喜,姜春,罗利华,等.新型研发机构成果转化扩散绩效评价体系设计[J].情报杂志,2018,37 (8):162-171+113.
[36]孟溦,宋娇娇.新型研发机构绩效评估研究——基于资源依赖和社会影响力的双重视角[J].科研管理,2019,40 (8):20-31.
[37]关忠诚,张炎.科研组织相对效率评价定量方法研究[J].中国管理科学,2003 (5):90-95.