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| Reflections and Reshaping of Governance on Not-in-My-Backyard ——Case-Based Empirical Analysis |
| Yan Dekui |
| School of Law,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350116,China |
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Abstract A series of NIMBY (Not in my backyard)phenomena occurring currently highlights the “interaction without rules”between the government and citizens,featuring the lack of reason of legal procedures.Behind the “stop in the case of troubles”of some public environment projects,the failure of tackling NIMBY difficulties with the existing governance structure is reflected.Generally,the action strategy of protesters in NIMBY conflicts mainly consists of two stages:the early-stage tolerance and the late-stage excessive demands and self-protection.Correspondingly,the government would adopt the tough,compromising and legalization strategies successively on the basis of economic development and social stability according to the response mode.Under the control of the polarized NIMBY conflict management structure of technological rationality and stability maintenance politics,the government dominated by technology bureaucracy is usually wandering between technology myth and political operation while dealing with NIMBY issues.To this end,we should introduce public participation from the location of NIMBY conflicts,strengthen environmental protection supervision of the operation of NIMBY conflicts,and provide communication and consultation channels for NIMBY conflict stakeholders afterwards to reshape the governance structure of NIMBY conflicts
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Received: 17 September 2018
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2019, Vol. 0 
