监督视角下政府创新补助对国有企业创新的影响研究

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Abstract Based on the date of listed state-owned companies from 2009 to 2018,this paper studies the impact of government innovation subsidies on state-owned enterprise innovation and the effect of government supervision and social supervision on the relationship between the two.The study found the followings.①Government innovation subsidies will promote innovation input and substantial innovation output of state-owned enterprises.②From the perspective of government supervision audits,government audits play a positive moderating role between innovation subsidies and state-owned enterprise innovation,which can improve the incentive effect of innovation subsidies.③From the perspective of social supervision,highly qualified auditors can play a positive moderating effect and promote innovation in state-owned enterprises,while the regulatory role of institutional investor supervision is not significant.Further research found that government audits and supervision by highly qualified auditors can have a superimposed effect on corporate innovation.This research is helpful to understand the role of supervision in government innovation subsidies,and has important theoretical and practical significance for reducing waste of government resources and improving the incentive effect of innovation subsidies.

Key words： Innovation subsidy State-owned enterprise innovation Government audit Social spervision

Received: 17 December 2020

PACS:	F49
	F424

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	Articles by authors
	Yu Huixin
	Guan Zhonglu
	Zhang Miao
	Xing Hui

Cite this article:

Yu Huixin,Guan Zhonglu,Zhang Miao, et al. Research on the Impact of Government Innovation Subsidies on the Innovation of State-Owned Enterprises from the Perspective of Supervision[J]. , 2021, 2(10): 14-24.

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http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2021/V2/I10/14

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