复合型碳减排机制下企业低碳技术创新战略的博弈分析

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Abstract Based on the stock difference of low carbon technology,the paper constructed an evolutionary game model about choosing innovation strategies for two kinds of enterprises,and simulated the dynamic selection process of the low carbon technology innovation model through numerical simulation in the context of different carbon tax rate and carbon trading prices.The main results show that:technology stock and capacity are the fundamental constraints for enterprise to choose low carbon technology innovation strategy.The weaker companies are sensitive to the carbon tax rate and trading price,which force the companies to adopt imitation innovation for the technological gap.But the stronger ones mostly prefer to in-house innovation,and gain compensation benefit through carbon trading mechanism.The modest tax rates can stimulate weaker enterprise to strengthen the R&D activities,and provide the stronger ones with innovation offset.The carbon trading policy offers a market coordinated way to firms with different technical level,which respectively shows the compensation and alternative mechanism combined with carbon tax policy

Key words： Carbon tax Carbon trading Low carbon technology innovation Evolution game Numerical simulation

Received: 07 December 2016

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F270

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	Xiao Dingding
	Tian Wenhua

Cite this article:

Xiao Dingding,Tian Wenhua. Game Analysis of Carbon Tax and Carbon Trading on the Strategy of Enterprise’s Low Carbon Technology Innovation[J]. , 2017, 0(9): 105-113.

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http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2017/V0/I9/105

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