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| Game Model of the Profit Allocation Mechanism in Cooperative Innovation of the Science and Technology Basic Condition PlatformGao |
| Liang1,Feng Chujian2 |
1.School of Public Affairs,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China;
2.Ministry of Science and Technology Funds Supervision Service Center,Beijing 100038,China |
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Abstract By constructing a Stackelberg game model,the paper respectively builds the profit allocation model of platform of science and technology with an external institutions and with two external agencies.And then it compares and analyzes technology platform to get four important conclusions.To ensure the successful cooperation,the platform must take“selective”cooperation,especially along with the increase in external cooperation agencies,selective cooperation conditions more and more strict.Finally,it analyzes the conclusion and puts forward relevant measures.
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Received: 23 November 2015
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2016, Vol. 0 
