美国对华半导体竞争战略的思想基础、竞争主线及局限

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Abstract The rise of China's semiconductor will endanger the U.S.economic interests,and national security has become a“Washington consensus”.The U.S.has taken the lead in launching a competitive semiconductor strategy against China,attempting to curb China's semiconductor development by imposing punitive tariffs,increasing investment restrictions,strengthening export controls,and enhancing U.S.semiconductor strength by increasing investment,implementing preferential policies,and cultivating talent to achieve the goal of maintaining U.S.semiconductor leadership.However,the U.S.competitive semiconductor strategy toward China faces real problems,including difficulty localizing the supply chain,hindering semiconductor technology innovation,and undermining the interests of allies.In the context of the power shift between China and the United States,the United States will place the enhancement of semiconductor competitiveness at the top of its semiconductor competition strategy with China in the future while launching a more precise technology decoupling against China and the semiconductor competition between China and the United States will become more and more intense.On this basis,this paper proposes three countermeasures for China to cope with the U.S.semiconductor competition strategy.First,strengthen dialogue and communication to reduce the U.S.strategic misjudgment of China;Second,find strategic breaks to break through the U.S.blockade;Third,build a domestic industrial ecology to achieve precise technological innovation.

Key words： China-U.S.relation Semiconductor competition Chip and Science Act

Received: 17 June 2022

PACS:	F171.2
	D771.2

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Cite this article:

Qin Lin. The Origin of the U.S.Competitive Strategy for Semiconductors in China, the Main Lines of Competition and Limitations[J]. , 2023, 4(5): 172-180.

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http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2023/V4/I5/172

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