经济增加值考核是否会引发企业研发操纵行为——基于双重差分模型的实证研究

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Abstract R&D manipulation has an adverse impact on the future performance and value creation of enterprises.At present,relevant researches mainly focus on whether there is R&D manipulation under the recognition of high-tech enterprises and the tax deduction policies.Taking the event that the central state-owned enterprises comprehensively implemented the economic value added assessment in 2010 as a natural experiment,this paper selects the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2008 to 2020 as the research samples and constructs a difference-in-difference model to empirically test whether the implementation of EVA assessment trigger central enterprises' R&D manipulation or not,and further explores the mechanism of R&D manipulation in the relationship between EVA assessment and corporate value.The results show that the implementation of EVA assessment will trigger some enterprises' R&D manipulation.EVA assessment will inhibit the promotion of corporate value of central enterprises as a whole,partly due to the existence of the forward R&D manipulation of the company.The forward R&D manipulation of enterprises has played an intermediary effect in the process of EVA assessment affecting the promotion of corporate value.The conclusions of this paper expand the research on the driving factors of enterprise R&D manipulation and help the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council to improve the incentive effect of EVA assessment by supervising R&D manipulation.

Key words： Economic value added (EVA) Assessment R&D manipulation Corporate value Intermediary effect

Received: 09 October 2021

PACS:

F273.1

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	Hao Ting
	Ma Yanshuo

Cite this article:

Hao Ting,Ma Yanshuo. Whether Economic Value Added Assessment Trigger Corporate R&D Manipulation or Not——Empirical Research Based on Difference-in-Difference Model[J]. , 2022, 3(10): 75-84.

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http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2022/V3/I10/75

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