利益博弈视角下的“科创中国”政策执行:制约因素与推进策略

Abstract
Figure/Table
References
Related Citation (6)

Download: PDF (1143 KB) HTML (1 KB)
Export: BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)

Abstract The discordant of S&T and economy is a chronic disease that has plagued the high-quality development of China's economy.In order to promote the integration of S&T and economy,China Association for Science and Technology launched and implemented the“Kechuang China”policy.We systematically analyzed the game of one-to-many audit inside the association system during the preparatory stage of the policy implementation,the game between the upper and lower levels of the executive,and the game between the grassroots executive and the target group in the formal implementation stage.The findings are as follows.First,the dynamic game between the multi-action subjects based on their own interests is the root cause that leads to the block of policy implementation.Second,the particularity of executing subjects,target groups and policy types leads to the diversity of game subjects and the multi-stages of game process,which makes the mechanism of implementation block more complicated.Third,the key strategy to promote the implementation is to establish a collaborative innovation system of government,industry,university,research institute and society,and it's necessary to design an incentive and constraint mechanism for the upper and lower levels of executives and target groups throughout the implementation stages.In theory,by analyzing the implementation process of a high ambiguity and low conflict policy which mainly implemented by social organization,our research will deepen the understanding of implementation phenomena.In practice,by providing suggestions for promoting the construction of“Kechuang China”,it will help scientific society to serve the integration of S&T and economy.

Key words： Policy implementation Integration of S&T and economy Scientific society Game theory

Received: 01 November 2021

PACS:

G322.25

	Service

	E-mail this article
	Add to my bookshelf
	Add to citation manager
	E-mail Alert
	RSS
	Articles by authors
	Yuan Meng
	Meng Fanrong

Cite this article:

Yuan Meng,Meng Fanrong. Restricting Factors and Promoting Strategies for the Implementation of“Kechuang China”:From the Perspective of Benefit Game[J]. , 2022, 3(8): 9-17.

URL:

http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2022/V3/I8/9

[1]王春法.关于科技社团在国家创新体系中地位和作用的几点思考[J].科学学研究,2012,30(10):1445-1448.
[2]鲁云鹏.科技社团治理:内涵、问题与实现[J].中国科技论坛,2019(11):1-9.
[3]周大亚.科技社团在国家创新体系中的地位与作用研究述评[J].社会科学管理与评论,2013(4):69-84.
[4]张豪,张向前.我国科技类协会促进经济发展的价值分析[J].中国软科学,2015(6):35-44.
[5]丁煌,定明捷.国外政策执行理论前沿评述[J].公共行政评论,2010,3(1):119-148,205-206.
[6]方雷,孟燕.从制度优势到治理效能——基于国家治理三维场域的中国共产党执行力解析[J].山西大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2021,44(2):117-124.
[7]SMITH T B.The policy implementation process[J].Policy sciences,1973,4(2):197-209.
[8]陈丽君,傅衍.我国公共政策执行逻辑研究述评[J].北京行政学院学报,2016(5):37-46.
[9]龚虹波.执行结构-政策执行-执行结果:一个分析中国公共政策执行的理论框架[J].社会科学,2008(3):105-111,190.
[10]丁煌.政策执行阻滞机制及其防治对策[M].北京:人民出版社,2002.
[11]钱再见,金太军.公共政策执行主体与公共政策执行中梗阻现象[J].中国行政管理,2002(2):56-57.
[12]荣敬本.“压力型体制”研究的回顾[J].经济社会体制比较,2013(6):1-3.
[13]DAVIDOVITZ M,COHEN N,GOFEN A.Governmental response to crises and its implications for street-level implementation:policy ambiguity,risk,and discretion during the COVID-19 pandemic[J].Journal of comparative policy analysis research and practice,2020,23(1):120-130.
[14]GREEN M S,ABDULLAH R,VERED S,et al.A study of ethnic,gender and educational differences in attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccines in Israel:implications for vaccination implementation policies[J].Israel journal of health policy research,2021,10:26.
[15]RHODES R.Understanding governance:policy networks,governance,reflexivity and accountability[J].Social studies,1998,39(4):182-184.
[16]蒋俊明.利益协调视域下公众参与型公共政策机制建构[J].政治学研究,2013(2):29-36.
[17]BRIAN W H.Forty years of wicked problems literature:forging closer links to policy studies[J].Policy & society,2019,38(2):180-197.
[18]BARDACH E,PRESS M.The implementation game:what happens after a bill becomes a law[J].American political science review,1977,72(4):323-1399.
[19]丁煌,李晓飞.逆向选择、利益博弈与政策执行阻滞[J].北京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版),2010,23(1):15-21.
[20]崔利利.从博弈论视角解读政策执行阻滞[J].理论导刊,2010(1):19-24.
[21]岳宇君,胡汉辉.科技型中小企业支持政策传导机制及博弈分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2017,38(4):105-116.
[22]雷超男,廖晓明.跨界水环境政策执行受阻的博弈分析——以黄河流域水污染防治为例[J].领导科学,2020(8):27-31.
[23]郭俊华,陈铭萱.我国节能减排政策执行阻滞及其消解对策研究——基于博弈论视角的分析[J].太平洋学报,2011,19(11):65-73.
[24]丁煌,定明捷.“上有政策、下有对策”——案例分析与博弈启示[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004(6):804-809.
[25]姚松.博弈论视野下的教育政策执行主体行为偏差成因——基于对农村教育布局调整政策运行状况的考察[J].现代教育管理,2014(1):61-66.
[26]MERTHA A.China's“soft”centralization:shifting tiao/kuai authority relations[J].China quarterly,2005,184(1):791-810.
[27]陈世香,邹胜男.地方政府公共文化政策执行阻滞的生成逻辑——基于制度环境三维度理论框架的分析[J].上海行政学院学报,2019,20(3):25-36.
[28]MATLAND R E.Synthesizing the implementation literature:the ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation[J].Journal of public administration research & theory,1995,5(2):145-174.
[29]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,1997.
[30]何艳玲,汪广龙.中国转型秩序及其制度逻辑[J].中国社会科学,2016(6):47-65,205.
[31]王芳,赵兰香,戴小勇.中国企业基础研究偏好异质性的影响因素分析[J].科研管理,2021,42(3):12-22.