信息通信技术行业标准必要专利许可费计算方法研究——基于TCL对爱立信和UP对华为案的比较

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Abstract Prior to setting any standards,standard-setting organizations usually require the owner of standard essential patents (SEPs)to commit to license their patents under FRAND terms to avoiding patent hold-up and royalty stacking.However,dispute of SEPs royalty under FRAND principle has arisen from vagueness and fuzziness of FRAND itself.TCL V.Ericsson and Unwired Planet.V.Huawei are two significantly influential cases involving FRAND licensing fees in the judicial field in recent years.Both of them adopt Top Down Approach and Comparable License to calculate SEPs royalty in detail.However,due to the differences in the specific application of the two methods adopted by judges,the results of judgments in two cases are quite different.Furthermore,Huawei and TCL are both Chinese companies as the licensees in two cases.This paper compares and analyses the specific application of the mentioned two methods in two cases,and finds out their differences,in order to enlighten the theory and judicial practice of SEPs royalty calculation,guide patent licensing and promote SEPs innovation of Chinese ICT enterprises.

Key words： Standard Essential Patents FRAND principle Royalty Hold-up

Received: 17 March 2019

PACS:

D923.42

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	Zhang Yurong
	Zhang Xiaona

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Zhang Yurong,Zhang Xiaona. A Study on the Calculation of Royalty of Standard Essential Patents in the Field of ICT ——Comparison Based on the Cases of TCL V.Ericsson and Unwired Planet V.Huawei[J]. , 2019, 0(12): 126-135.

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http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/EN/Y2019/V0/I12/126

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