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| The Judicial Regulation Dilemma of the Abuse of Standard Essential Patent Injunctive Relief and Its Improvement |
| Guo Rengui |
| Intellectual Property Research Institute of Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China |
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Abstract The abuse of the standard essential patent injunctive relief can result in the exclusion or limitation of market competition,and harm the order of the market competition and consumers' interests.So the court should regulate it.But because of the slightly new type and strong technical nature of the cases,when the cases are brought to the court for trial,there would arise some dilemmas,such as insufficient trial experience,lack of trial basis,and difficult choice of trial mode.Therefore it is necessary to make judicial regulation dilemma of the abuse of standard essential patent injunctive relief clear.Based on the above analysis of the dilemma and combined with the judicial experience of the German court and the European Court in the trial of standard essential patent injunctive relief cases,the judicial regulation system of the standard essential patent injunction relief in China can be improved in the following aspects:antitrust judicial trial basis,antitrust judicial trial mode and antitrust judicial trial considerations.By this way,the dilemma of judicial regulation will be solved,thus the relevant market competition order will be maintained and the development of technological innovation will be promoted.
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Received: 28 February 2018
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2019, Vol. 0 
